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a b s t r a c t
Since certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC) has received widespread attention
due to its efficiency in avoiding key escrow problems in identity-based public key
cryptography (ID-PKC), the certificateless authenticated key agreement (CLAKA) protocol,
an important part of CLPKC, has been studied a great deal. Most CLAKA protocols are built
from pairings which need costly operations. To improve the performance, several pairing-
free CLAKA protocols have been proposed. In this paper, we propose a new pairing-free
CLAKAprotocol. Comparedwith the related protocols, our protocol has better performance.
Also, our protocol is provably secure in a very strong security model—the extended
Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) model.
Crown Copyright© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Public key cryptography is an important technique for realizing network and information security. In traditional public
key cryptography (PKC), a certificate is needed to ensure the relation between a public key and the identity of the holder. As
a result, problems of certificatemanagement, such as revocation, storage, distribution etc, emerge [1]. To simplify certificate
management problems, Shamir introduced the concept of identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) [2]. In ID-PKC,
a user’s public key can be derived from their identity (e.g., their name or email address) and their secret key is generated by
a trusted third party called the key generation center (KGC). However, ID-based cryptography inevitably suffers from a key
escrow problem, i.e. PKG knows all the user’s secret keys. In 2003, Al-Riyami et al. [3] proposed certificateless public key
cryptography (CLPKC) for solving the key escrow problem in ID-PKC.
Following the work of Al-Riyami et al. [3], numerous certificateless authenticated key agreement (CLAKA) protocols
[4–10] using pairings have been proposed. However, the relative computation cost of a pairing is approximately twenty
times higher than that of the scalarmultiplication over the elliptic curve group [11]. Therefore, pairing-free CLAKA protocols
would bemore appealing in terms of efficiency. Recently, several pairing-free CLAKA protocols [12–15] have been proposed.
Yang et al. [14] pointed out that neither the Geng et al. protocol [12], nor the Hou et al. protocol [13] is secure. He et al. [15]
also proposed apairing-free CLAKAprotocol. However, theHe et al. protocol is vulnerable to a type1 adversary [16]. Although
the latest CLAKA protocol [16] ismore efficient than other protocols [12–15], it is provably secure under a veryweakmodel—
the mBR model [17]. Yang et al. have shown that their protocol is provably secure in a very strong model—the extended
Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK)model [18]. However, in the Yang et al. protocol, nine elliptic curve scalarmultiplications are needed
to finish the key agreement and the validity of public keys also needs to be verified. This not only increases the user’s burden,
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but also reverses the notion of the CLPKC. In this paper,wewill propose a newpairing-free CLAKAprotocol, which is provably
secure in the eCK model. Also, the user in our protocol just needs four elliptic curve scalar multiplications to finish the key
agreement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some preliminaries. In Section 3, we propose our
CLAKA protocol. The security analysis of the proposed protocol is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, performance analysis
is presented. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude with the result.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation
In this subsection, we first introduce some notation used in this paper, as follows:
• p, n: two large prime numbers;
• Fp: a finite field;
• E/Fp: an elliptic curve defined on Fp;
• G: the cyclic additive group composed of the points on E/Fp;
• P: a generator of G;
• H1(·): a secure one-way hash function, where H1 : {0, 1}∗ × G× G → Z∗n ;• H2(·): a secure one-way hash function, where H2 : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ × G× G× G× G → Z∗p ;• IDi: the identity of user i;
• (x, Ppub): the KGC’s private/public key pair, where Ppub = xP;
• (xi, Pi): the user i’s secret value/public key pair, where Pi = xi · P;
• (ri, Ri): a random point generated by KGC, where Ri = ri · P;
• (si, Ri): the user i’s partial private key, where si = ri + hixmod n, hi = H1(IDi, Ri, Pi);
• (ti, Ti): the user i’s ephemeral private/public key pair, where Ti = ti · P .
2.2. Background for the elliptic curve group
Let the symbol E/Fp denote an elliptic curve E over a prime finite field Fp, defined by an equation
y2 = x3 + ax+ b, a, b ∈ Fp (1)
and with the discriminant
∆ = 4a3 + 27b2 ≠ 0. (2)
The points on E/Fp together with an extra point O called the point at infinity form a group
G = {(x, y) : x, y ∈ Fp, E(x, y) = 0} ∪ {O}. (3)
G is a cyclic additive group with the point addition ‘‘+’’ defined as follows. Let P,Q ∈ G, l be the line containing P and
Q (the line tangent to E/Fp if P = Q ), and R be the third point of intersection of l with E/Fp. Let l′ be the line connecting R
and O. Then P ‘‘+’’ Q is the point such that l′ intersects E/Fp at R and O. Scalar multiplication over E/Fp can be computed as
follows:
tP = P + P + · · · + P (t times). (4)
Let the order of G be n. The following problems are commonly used in the security analysis of many cryptographic
protocols.
The computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) problem: Given a generator P of G and (aP, bP) for unknown a, b∈R Z∗n , the task of
the CDH problem is to compute abP .
The decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) problem: Given a generator P of G and (aP, bP, cP) for unknown a, b, c ∈R Z∗n , the task of
the DDH problem is to decide whether the equation abP = cP holds.
The gap Diffie–Hellman (GDH) problem: Given a generator P of G, (aP, bP) for unknown a, b∈R Z∗n and an oracle
DDH(aP, bP, cP), which returns 1 if and only if abP = cP , the task of the GDH problem is to compute abP . The GDH
assumption states that the probability of any polynomial-time algorithm solving the GDH problem is negligible.
2.3. The CLAKA protocol and security model
A CLAKA protocol consists of six polynomial-time algorithms [2,8]: Setup, Partial-Private-Key-Extract, Set-Secret-
Value, Set-Private-Key, Set-Public-Key and Key-Agreement . As defined in [9,14], there are two kinds of adversaries with
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different capabilities against the CLAKAprotocol. The type 1 adversaryA 1 acts as a dishonest userwhile the type 2 adversary
A 2 acts as a malicious key generation center (KGC). A 1 does not know the master key, but A 1 can replace the public keys
of any entity with a value of their choice. A 2 knows the master key, but cannot replace any user’s public key.
Let Π si,j represent the tth session which runs for party i with intended partner party j. A session
s
i,j enters an accepted
state when it computes a session key SK si,j. Note that a session may terminate without ever entering into an accepted state.
Two sessions
s
i,j and
t
j,i are called matching if they have the same session identity.
Lippold et al. [9] transformed the original eCK model [18] from the traditional PKC setting to the CLPKC setting. The eCK
model in the CLPKC setting is defined by the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A ∈ {A 1,A 2}. The
game runs in two phases. During the first phase, the adversary A is allowed to issue the following queries in any order:
Create(i): On receiving such a query, C generates the public/private key pair for participant iwith identity IDi.
RevealMasterKey: C gives the master secret key to A .
RevealSessionKey
s
i,j

: If the session has not been accepted, C returns⊥ toA . Otherwise C returns the accepted session
key to A .
RevealPartialPrivateKey(i): C returns participant i’s partial private key to A .
RevealSecretValue(i): C returns participant i’s secret value to A .
ReplacePublicKey(i, pk): C replaces participant i’s public key with the value chosen by A .
RevealEphemeralKey
s
i,j

: C returns participant i’s ephemeral secret key to A .
Send
s
i,j,m

: The adversary sends the message m to the session
s
i,j and gets a response according to the protocol
specification.
Once the adversary A decides that the first phase is over, it starts the second phase by choosing a fresh session
s
i,j and
issuing a Test
s
i,j

query, where the fresh session and test query are defined later.
The type 1 adversaryA 1 could get any user’s secret value, since it can replace the public key of any entity with a value of
its choice. The type 2 adversaryA 2 could get any user’s partial private key since it has access to themaster key. Then several
cases in the Lippold et al. model do not exist. We define freshness for the CLAKA protocol against two kinds of adversaries
as follows.
Definition 1 (Freshness for the CLAKA Protocol Against a Type 1 Adversary). Let for instance
s
i,j be a completed session,
which is executed by an honest party iwith another honest party j. We define
s
i,j to be fresh if none of the following three
conditions holds:
• The adversary A 1 reveals the session key ofsi,j or of its matching session (if the latter exists).
• j is engaged intj,i, the session matching tosi,j, and A 1 either reveals both i’s partial private key andsi,j’s ephemeral
secret or both j’s partial private key and
t
j,i’s ephemeral secret.
• No session matching tosi,j exists and A 1 either reveals both i’s partial private key andsi,j’s ephemeral secret or j’s
partial private key.
Definition 2 (Freshness for the CLAKA Protocol Against a Type 2 Adversary). Let for instance
s
i,j be a completed session,
which is executed by an honest party iwith another honest party j. We define
s
i,j to be fresh if none of the following three
conditions holds:
• The adversary A 2 reveals the session key ofsi,j or of its matching session (if the latter exists).
• j is engaged intj,i, the session matching tosi,j, and A 2 either reveals both i’s secret value andsi,j’s ephemeral secret
or both j’s secret value and
t
j,i’s ephemeral secret.
• No session matching tosi,j exists and A 2 either reveals both i’s secret value andsi,j’s ephemeral secret or j’s partial
private key.
Test
s
i,j

: At some point,A may choose one of the oracles, say
s
i,j, to ask a single Test query. This oracle must be fresh.
To answer the query, the oracle flips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and returns the session key held bysi,j if b = 0, or a random
sample from the distribution of the session key if b = 1.
At the end of the game, A must output a guess bit b′. A wins if and only if b′ = b. A ’s advantage for winning the above
game, denoted by AdvA (k), is defined as AdvA (k) =
Pr[b′ = b] − 12 , where k is a security parameter.
Definition 3. A CLAKA protocol is said to be secure if:
(1) In the presence of a benign adversary in sessions
s
i,j and
t
j,i, both oracles always agree on the same session key, and
this key is distributed uniformly at random.
(2) For any adversary A ∈ {A 1,A 2}, AdvA (k) is negligible.
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3. Our protocol
In this section, we will propose a new CLAKA protocol based on previous works [9,14,16]. Our protocol also consists of
six polynomial-time algorithms. They are described as follows.
Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter k as an input, and returns system parameters and a master key. Given
k, KGC executes the following steps.
(1) KGC chooses a k-bit prime p and determines the tuple {Fp, E/Fp,G, P} as defined in Section 2.1.
(2) KGC chooses the master private key x ∈ Z∗n and computes the master public key Ppub = xP .
(3) KGC chooses two cryptographic secure hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ × G → Z∗n and H2 : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ × G× G× G×
G× G → Z∗n .
(4) KGC publishes params = {Fp, E/Fp,G, P, Ppub,H1,H2} as system parameters and secretly keeps the master key x.
Partial–Private–Key–Extract: This algorithm takes master key, a user’s identifier, and system parameters as inputs, and
returns the user’s ID-based private key. With this algorithm, for each user with identity IDi, KGC works as follows.
(1) KGC chooses a random number ri ∈ Z∗n , and computes Ri = ri · P and hi = H1(IDi, Ri).
(2) KGC computes si = ri + hixmod n and issues {si, Ri} to the users through a secret channel.
The user’s s partial private key is si and they can validate their private key by checking whether the equation si · P =
Ri + hi · Ppub holds. The private key is valid if the equation holds and vice versa.
Set–Secret–Value: The user with identity IDi picks randomly xi ∈ Z∗n , computes Pi = xi · P and sets xi as their secret value.
Set–Private–Key: The user with identity IDi takes the pair ski = (xi, si) as its private key.
Set–Public–Key: The user with identity IDi takes pki = (Pi) as its public key.
Key–Agreement: Assume that an entity A with identity IDA has private key skA = (xA, sA) and public key pkA = (PA) and
an entity Bwith identity IDB has private key skB = (xB, sB) and public key pkB = (PB). If they want to establish a session key,
as shown in Fig. 1, the following steps will be executed.
(1) A chooses a random number tA ∈ Z∗n and computes TA = tA · P; then A sendsM1 = {IDA, RA, TA} to B.
(2) After receivingM1, B chooses a random number tB ∈ Z∗n and computes TB = tB · P; then B sendsM2 = {IDB, RB, TB} to A.
Then both A and B could compute their shared secrets as follows:
A computes
K 1AB = (tA + sA)(TB + RB + H1(IDB, RB)Ppub) (5)
K 2AB = (tA + xA)(TB + PB) (6)
and
K 3AB = tA · TB. (7)
B computes
K 1BA = (tB + sB)(TA + RA + H1(IDA, RA)Ppub) (8)
K 2BA = (tB + xB)(TA + PA) (9)
and
K 3BA = tB · TA. (10)
Thus the agreed session key for A and B can be computed as
sk = H2(IDA∥IDB∥TA∥TB∥K 1AB∥K 2AB∥K 3AB)
= H2(IDA∥IDB∥TA∥TB∥K 1BA∥K 2BA∥K 3BA). (11)
Since TA = tA · P, PA = xA · P, sAP = RA + H1(IDA, RA)Ppub, TB = tB · P, PB = xB · P and sBP = RB + H1(IDB, RB)Ppub, we
then have
K 1AB = (tA + sA)(TB + RB + H1(IDB, RB)Ppub)= (tA + sA)(tB + sB)P = (tB + sB)(tA + sA)P
= (tB + sB)(TA + RA + H1(IDA, RA)Ppub) = K 1BA (12)
K 2AB = (tA + xA)(TB + PB)= (tA + xA)(tB + xB)P = (tB + xB)(tA + xA)P
= (tB + xB)(TA + PA) = K 2BA (13)
and
K 3AB = tAtBP = tBtAP = K 3BA. (14)
Thus, the correctness of the protocol is proved.
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Fig. 1. Key agreement of our protocol.
4. Security analysis
In this section, we will show that our protocol is provably secure in the eCK model. We treat H1 and H2 as two random
oracles [19]. For the security, the following lemmas and theorems are provided.
Lemma 1. If two oracles are matching, both of them will be accepted and will get the same session key, which is distributed
uniformly in the session key sample space.
Proof. From the correction analysis of our protocol in Section 3, we know that if two oracles are matching, then both of
them are accepted and have the same session key. The session keys are distributed uniformly since rA and rB are selected
uniformly during the protocol execution. 
Lemma 2. Assuming that the GDH problem is intractable, the advantage of a type 1 adversary against our protocol is negligible.
Proof. Suppose that there is a type 1 adversary A 1 who can win the game defined in Section 2.3 with a non-negligible
advantage AdvA 1(k) in polynomial time t . Then, we will show how to use the ability of A 1 to construct an algorithm C to
solve the GDH problem. C first chooses P0 ∈ G at random, sets P0 as the system public key Ppub, selects the system parameter
params = {Fp, E/Fp,G, P, Ppub,H1,H2}, and sends params to A 1.
Let n0 be the maximum number of sessions that any one party may have. Assume that the adversary A 1 activates at
most n1 distinct honest parties. Assume that the adversary A 1 activates at most n2 distinct hash queries. Assume also that
AdvA 1(k) is non-negligible. Since H1 and H2 are modeled as a random oracle, after the adversary issues the test query, it has
only three possible ways to distinguish the tested session key from a random string:
Case 1. Guessing attack: A 1 correctly guesses the session key.
Case 2. Key-replication attack: The adversary A 1 forces a non-matching session to have the same session key as the test
session. In this case, the adversary A 1 can simply learn the session key by querying the non-matching session.
Case 3. Forging attack: Assume that
T
I,J is the test session. At some point in its run, the adversary A 1 queries H2 on the
value (IDI , IDJ , TI , TJ , K 1IJ , K
2
IJ , K
3
IJ ) in the test session owned by I communicating with J . Clearly, in this case A 1 computes
the values K 1IJ , K
2
IJ , K
3
IJ itself.
From the similar analysis in [18,20], we know that the success probabilities of Guessing attack and Key-replication attack
are negligible. Thus Guessing attack and Key-replication attack can be ruled out. The rest of this section is mainly devoted to
the analysis of Forging attack.
In the following, a challengerC is interested in using the adversaryA 1 to turnA 1’s advantage in distinguishing the tested
session key from a random string into an advantage in solving the GDH problem. Let AdvGDHC (k) be the advantage that the
challengerC gets in solving the GDHproblemgiven the security parameter k. To solve the GDHproblemusingA 1, C is given
a GDH challengeU = uP, V = vP and an oracleDDH(∗, ∗, ∗), where u, v ∈ Zq, and C ’s task is to compute GDH(U, V ) = uvP .
C simulates the game outlined in Section 2.3. During the game, C has to answer all queries of the adversary A 1.
Before the game starts, C randomly selects two indexes I, J ∈ {1, . . . , n1} : I ≠ J , which represent the Ith and the Jth
distinct honest parties that the adversary initially chooses. Also, C chooses S ∈ {1, . . . , n0} and guesses that SI,J is the
Test session, which is correct with probability larger than 1
n0n21
. Let
S
J,I be the matching session of
S
I,J . The following two
sub-cases should be considered.
Case 3.1: The Test session has a matching session owned by another honest party.
Case 3.2: No honest party owns a session matching with the Test session.
(1) The analysis of Case 3.1
Since A 1 is strong type 1 adversary, then it can get all users’ secret key xi values through ReplacePublicKey queries.
According to Definition 1, C has the following four choices for A 1’s strategy:
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Case 3.1.1. A 1 may learn neither the ephemeral secret of I nor the partial private key of J .
Case 3.1.2. A 1 may learn neither the ephemeral secret of J nor the partial private key of I .
Case 3.1.3. A 1 may learn neither the partial private key of I nor that of IDJ .
Case 3.1.4. A 1 may learn neither the ephemeral secret of I nor that of J .
(1.1) The analysis of Case 3.1.1
C answers A 1’s queries as follows.
Create(i): C maintains an initially empty list LC consisting of tuples of the form (IDi, si, Ri, xi, Pi). If i = J, C chooses
two random numbers hi, xi ∈ Z∗n , computes Ri = U − hiP0, Pi = xiP , sets H1(IDi, Ri) ← hi and stores (IDi,⊥, Ri, xi, Pi)
and (IDi, Ri, hi) in LC and LH1 separately. Otherwise, C chooses three random numbers si, hi, xi ∈ Z∗n , computes Ri =
siP − hiPpub, Pi = xiP , sets H1(IDi, Ri)← hi and stores (IDi, si, Ri, xi, Pi) and (IDi, Ri, hi) in LC and LH1 separately.
H1(IDi, Ri): C maintains an initially empty list LH1 which contains tuples of the form (IDi, Ri, hi). If (IDi, Ri) is on the list
LH1 , C returns hi. Otherwise, C chooses a random number hi, stores (IDi, Ri, hi) in LH1 and returns hi.
H2(IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk): C maintains an initially empty list LH2 with entries of the form (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2,
Z3, sk). If the tuple is in the list LH2 , C responds with sk. Otherwise, C responds to these queries in the following way:
• If IDi = IDJ :
– C looks up the list LS for entry (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, ∗). If C finds the entry, it computes
Z1 = Z1 − ti(Tj + Rj + H1(IDj, Rj))− sj(Ri + H1(IDi, Ri)). (15)
– Then C checks whether Z1 is correct by checking whether the oracle DDH(∗, ∗, ∗) outputs 1 when the tuple (Ri +
H1(IDi, Ri)Ppub, Tj, Z1) is input. C also checks whether Z2 and Z3 are equal by checking whether the equations Z2 =
(ti+xi)(Tj+Pj) and Z3 = tiTj hold separately. If Z1, Z2 and Z3 are correct, C stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk)
in LH2 , where the value sk comes from LS . Otherwise, C chooses a random number sk ∈ {0, 1}k and stores the tuple
(IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk) in LH2 .• Otherwise:
– C looks up the list LS for entry (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, ∗). If C finds the entry, it stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk) in
LH2 , where the value sk comes from LS .
– Otherwise, C chooses a random number sk ∈ {0, 1}k and stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk) in LH2 .
RevealPartialPrivateKey(i): C answers A 1’s queries as follows.
• If IDi = IDJ then C stops the simulation.
• Otherwise, C looks up the list LE and returns the corresponding partial private key si to the adversary A 1.
RevealSecretValue(i):C looks up the table LC for entry (IDi, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗). IfC finds the entry, it returns xi. Otherwise,C carries
out the query Create(i) and returns the corresponding xi.
ReplacePublicKey(i, pk): Upon receiving the query, C looks up the table LC for entry (IDi, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗). If C finds the entry, it
replaces xi and Pi with x′i and P
′
i separately, where pk = (P ′i ) and P ′i = x′iP . Otherwise, C carries out Create(i) and replaces xi
and Pi with x′i and P
′
i separately.
RevealEphemeralKey
t
i,j

: C answers A 1’s queries as follows.
• Ifti,j =TI,J , then C stops the simulation.• Otherwise, C returns the stored ephemeral private key to A 1.
RevealMasterKey: C stops the simulation.
RevealSessionKey
t
i,j

: C answers A 1’s queries as follows.
• Ifti,j =TI,J orti,j =LJ,I , then C stops the simulation.• Otherwise, C returns the session key sk to A 1.
Send
t
i,j,m

: C maintains an initially empty list LS with entries of the form (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, sk) and answersA 1’s queries
as follows.
• Ifti,j =SI,J , then C returns Ti = V to A 1.
• Otherwise, if IDi = IDJ , it generates a random ti ∈ Zn, and computes
Z1 = Z1 − ti(Tj + Rj + H1(IDj, Rj))− sj(Ri + H1(IDi, Ri)). (16)
Then C checks whether Z1 is correct by checking whether the oracle DDH(∗, ∗, ∗) outputs 1 when the tuple (Ri +
H1(IDi, Ri)Ppub, Tj, Z2) is input. C also checks whether Z2 and Z3 are equal by checking whether the equations Z2 =
(ti+xi)(Tj+Pj) and Z3 = tiTj hold separately. If Z1, Z2 and Z3 are correct, C stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, sk) in LS , where
the value sk comes from LH2 . Otherwise, C chooses a random number sk ∈ {0, 1}k and stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, sk)
in LS .
• Otherwise, C replies according to the specification of the protocol.
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Test
t
i,j

: C answers A 1’s queries as follows.
• Ifti,j ≠SI,J , then C stops the simulation.
• Otherwise, C generates a random number ξ ∈ {0, 1}k and returns it to A 1.
As the adversary A 1 mounts the forging attack, if A 1 succeeds, it must have queried oracle H2 on the form Z1 =
(tI + sI)(TJ + RJ + H1(IDJ , RJ)Ppub) = (tI + sI)(TJ + U), Z2 = (tI + xI)(TJ + PJ) and Z3 = tITJ , where TI = V is the
outgoingmessage of the Test session given by the simulator and TJ is the incomingmessage from the adversaryA 1. To solve
GDH(U, V ), for all entries in LH2 , C randomly chooses one entry with the probability
1
n2
and proceeds with the following
steps:
C computes
Z1 = Z1 − sI(TJ + U). (17)
It is easy to verify that the equation Z1 = GDH(TI , TJ)+ GDH(U, V ) holds. Then C computes
GDH(U, V ) = Z1 − GDH(TI , TJ) = Z1 − Z3. (18)
The advantage of C solving the GDH problem is such that
AdvGDHC (k) ≥
1
n0n21n2
AdvA 1(k). (19)
ThenAdvGDHC (k) is non-negligible sincewe assume thatAdvA 1(k) is non-negligible. This contradicts theGDHassumption.
(1.2) The analysis of Case 3.1.2
By exchanging the roles of I and J in the above case, we can prove that AdvGDHC (k) is negligible by the same method as in
the above case. To save space, we will not give the details here.
(1.3) The analysis of Case 3.1.3
C answers H1(IDi, Ri), ReplacePublicKey(i, pk), RevealSecretValue(i), RevealEphemeralKey
s
i,j

, RevealMasterKey,
RevealSessionKey
s
i,j

and Test
s
i,j

as it does in Case 3.1.1. It also answers the other queries as follows.
Create(i): C maintains an initially empty list LC consisting of tuples of the form (IDi, si, Ri, xi, Pi). If IDi = IDI , C chooses
two random numbers hi, xi ∈ Z∗n , computes Ri = U − hiPpub, Pi = xiP , sets H1(IDi, Ri) ← hi and stores (IDi,⊥, Ri, xi, Pi)
and (IDi, Ri, hi) in LC and LH1 separately. Otherwise, if IDi = IDJ , C chooses two random numbers hi, xi ∈ Z∗n , computes
Ri = V − hiPpub, Pi = xiP , sets H1(IDi, Ri) ← hi and stores (IDi,⊥, Ri, xi, Pi) and (IDi, Ri, hi) in LC and LH1 separately.
Otherwise, C chooses three random numbers si, hi, xi ∈ Z∗n , computes Ri = siP − hiP0, Pi = xiP , sets H1(IDi, Ri) ← hi and
stores (IDi, si, Ri, xi, Pi) and (IDi, Ri, hi) in LC and LH1 separately.
H2(IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk): C maintains an initially empty list LH2 with entries of the form (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2,
Z3, sk). If the tuple is in the list LH2 , C responds with sk. Otherwise, C responds to these queries in the following way:
• If IDi = IDI or IDi = IDJ , C simulates the oracle in the same way as in Case 3.1.1.• Otherwise:
– C looks up the list LS for entry (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, ∗). If C finds the entry, it stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk) in
LH2 , where the value sk comes from LS .
– Otherwise, C chooses a random number sk ∈ {0, 1}k and stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk) in LH2 .
RevealPartialPrivateKey(i): C answers A 1’s queries as follows.
• If IDi = IDI or IDi = IDJ then C stops the simulation.• Otherwise, C looks up the list LC and returns the corresponding partial private key si to the adversary A 1.
Send
t
i,j,m

: C maintains an initially empty list LS with entries of the form (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, sk) and answersA 1’s queries
as follows.
• If IDi = IDI or IDi = IDJ , C simulates the oracle in the same way as in Case 3.1.1.• Otherwise, C replies according to the specification of the protocol.
As the adversary A 1 mounts the forging attack, if A 1 succeeds, it must have queried oracle H2 on the form Z1 =
(tI + sI)(TJ + RJ +H1(IDJ , RJ)Ppub) = (tI + sI)(TJ + V ), Z2 = (tI + xI)(TJ + PJ) and Z3 = tITJ , where RI +H1(IDI , RI)Ppub = U
and TJ are the incoming messages from the adversary A 1. To solve GDH(U, V ), for all entries in LH2 , C randomly chooses
one entry with the probability 1n2 and proceeds with the following steps:
C computes
GDH(U, V ) = Z1 − tI(TJ + V )− tJU . (20)
The advantage of C solving the GDH problem is such that
AdvGDHC (k) ≥
1
n0n21n2
AdvA 1(k). (21)
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ThenAdvGDHC (k) is non-negligible sincewe assume thatAdvA 1(k) is non-negligible. This contradicts theGDHassumption.
(1.4) The analysis of Case 3.1.4
C answers H1(IDi, Ri), ReplacePublicKey(i, pk), RevealSecretValue(i), RevealMasterKey RevealSessionKey
s
i,j

and Tests
i,j

as it does in the above case. It also answers the other queries as follows.
Create(i): C maintains an initially empty list LC consisting of tuples of the form (IDi, si, Ri, xi, Pi). C chooses three random
numbers si, hi, xi ∈ Z∗n , computes Ri = siP−hiPpub, Pi = xiP , setsH1(IDi, Ri)← hi and stores (IDi, si, Ri, xi, Pi) and (IDi, Ri, hi)
in LC and LH1 separately.
H2(IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk): C maintains an initially empty list LH2 with entries of the form (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2,
Z3, sk). If the tuple is in the list LH2 , C responds with sk. Otherwise, C responds to these queries in the following way:
• C looks up the list LS for entry (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, ∗). If C finds the entry, it computes
Z1 = Z1 − si(Tj + Rj + H1(IDj, Rj))− sjTi (22)
and
Z2 = Z2 − xi(Tj + Pj)− xjTi. (23)
Then C checks whether Zi is correct by checking whether the oracle DDH(∗, ∗, ∗) outputs 1 when the tuple (Ti, Tj, Z i) is
input, where i = 1, 2, 3. If Z1, Z2 and Z3 are correct, C stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk) in LH2 , where the value
sk comes from LS . Otherwise, C chooses a random number sk ∈ {0, 1}k and stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk)
in LH2 .
• Otherwise, C chooses a random number sk ∈ {0, 1}k and stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk) in LH2 .
RevealPartialPrivateKey(i): C looks up the list LC and returns the corresponding partial private key si to the adversary A .
RevealEphemeralKey
t
i,j

: C answers A 1’s queries as follows.
• Ifti,j =TI,J orti,j =LJ,I , then C stops the simulation.• Otherwise, C returns the stored ephemeral private key to A 1.
Send
t
i,j,m

: C maintains an initially empty list LS with entries of the form (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, sk) and answersA ’s queries
as follows.
• Ifti,j =TI,J , C returns Ti = U to A 1.
• Otherwise, ifti,j =LI,J , C returns Ti = V to A 1.• Otherwise, C replies according to the specification of the protocol.
As the adversary A 1 mounts the forging attack, if A 1 succeeds, it must have queried oracle H2 on the form Z1 =
(tI + sI)(TJ + RJ + H1(IDJ , RJ)Ppub), Z2 = (tI + xI)(TJ + PJ) and Z3 = tITJ , where TI = U is the outgoing message of the
Test session given by the simulator and TJ = V is the incoming message from the adversary A 1. To solve GDH(U, V ), for all
entries in LH2 , C randomly chooses one entry with the probability
1
n2
and returns Z3 as the solution to GDH(U, V ).
The advantage of C solving the GDH problem is such that
AdvGDHC (k) ≥
1
n0n21n2
AdvA 1(k). (24)
ThenAdvGDHC (k) is non-negligible sincewe assume thatAdvA 1(k) is non-negligible. This contradicts theGDHassumption.
(2) The analysis of Case 3.2
In view of the definition of the freshness, the following two cases should be considered.
Case 3.2.1: At some point, the static private key owned by the party I has been revealed by the adversary A 1 (note that in
this case, according to the freshness definition,A 1 is not permitted to reveal the ephemeral private key of the Test session).
Being similar to Case 3.1.1, Case 3.2.1 can be solved using the samemethod as in the above section. To save space, we will
not give the details here.
Case 3.2.2: The static private key owned by the party I has never been revealed by the adversary A 1 (note that in this case,
according to the freshness definition, A 1 may reveal party I ’s ephemeral private key in the Test session).
Being similar to Case 3.1.2, this case can be solved using the same method as in the above section. To save space, we will
not give the details here.
If the adversaryA 1 succeedswith non-negligible probability in any of the cases above,we can also solve theGDHproblem
with non-negligible probability, which contradicts the assumed security of the GDH problem. So we can conclude that our
protocol bases its security on the GDH problem. 
Lemma 3. On the assumption that the GDH problem is intractable, the advantage of a type 2 adversary against our protocol is
negligible.
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Proof. Suppose that there is a type 2 adversary A 2 who can win the game defined in Section 2.3 with a non-negligible
advantage AdvA 2(k) in polynomial time t . Then, we will show how to use the ability of A 2 to construct an algorithm C to
solve the GDH problem. C first chooses x ∈ Zn at random, sets xP as the system public key Ppub, selects the system parameter
params = {Fp, E/Fp,G, P, Ppub,H1,H2}, and sends params and the master key x to A 2.
Let n0 be the maximum number of sessions that any one party may have. Assume that the adversary A 2 activates at
most n1 distinct honest parties. Assume that the adversary A 2 activates at most n2 distinct hash queries. Assume also that
AdvA 2(k) is non-negligible. Since H1 and H2 are modeled as a random oracle [19], after the adversary issues the test query,
it has only three possible ways to distinguish the tested session key from a random string:
Case 1. Guessing attack: A 2 correctly guesses the session key.
Case 2. Key-replication attack: The adversary A 2 forces a non-matching session to have the same session key as the test
session. In this case, the adversary A 2 can simply learn the session key by querying the non-matching session.
Case 3. Forging attack: Assume that
T
I,J is the test session. At some point in its run, the adversary A 2 queries H2 on the
value (IDI , IDJ , TI , TJ , K 1IJ , K
2
IJ , K
3
IJ ) in the test session owned by I communicating with J . Clearly, in this case A 2 computes
the values K 1IJ , K
2
IJ , K
3
IJ itself.
From similar analysis in [18,20], we know that the success probabilities of Guessing attack and Key-replication attack are
negligible. Thus Guessing attack and Key-replication attack can be ruled out. The rest of this section is mainly devoted to the
analysis of Forging attack.
In the following, a challengerC is interested in using the adversaryA 2 to turnA 2’s advantage in distinguishing the tested
session key from a random string into an advantage in solving the GDH problem. Let AdvGDHC (k) be the advantage that the
challenger C gets in solving the GDHproblem given the security parameter k. To solve the GDHproblemusingA 2, C is given
a GDH challengeU = uP, V = vP and an oracleDDH(∗, ∗, ∗), where u, v ∈ Zq, and C ’s task is to compute GDH(U, V ) = uvP .
C simulates the game outlined in Section 2.3. During the game, C has to answer all queries of the adversary A 2.
Before the game starts, C randomly selects two indexes I, J ∈ {1, . . . , n1} : I ≠ J , which represent the Ith and the Jth
distinct honest parties that the adversary initially chooses. Also, C chooses S ∈ {1, . . . , n0} and guesses that SI,J is the
Test session, which is correct with probability larger than 1
n0n21
. Let
S
J,I be the matching session of
S
I,J . The following two
sub-cases should be considered.
Case 3.1: The Test session has a matching session owned by another honest party.
Case 3.2: No honest party owns a session matching with the Test session.
(1) The analysis of Case 3.1
Since A 2 is strong type 1 adversary, then it can get all users’ partial private key si values since it acts as a malicious KGC
and has access to the master key. According to Definition 2, C has the following four choices for A 2’s strategy:
Case 3.1.1. A 2 may learn neither the ephemeral secret rI of I nor the secret value xJ of J .
Case 3.1.2. A 2 may learn neither the ephemeral secret rJ of J nor the secret value xI of I .
Case 3.1.3. A 2 may learn neither the secret value xI of I nor that, xJ , of J .
Case 3.1.4. A 2 may learn neither the ephemeral secret rI of I nor that, rJ , of J .
(1.1) The analysis of Case 3.1.1
C answers A 2’s queries as follows.
Create(i): C maintains an initially empty list LC consisting of tuples of the form (IDi, si, Ri, xi, Pi). If i = J, C chooses
two random numbers hi, ri ∈ Z∗n , computes Ri = riP, Pi = U, si = ri + hixmod n, sets H1(IDi, Ri) ← hi and stores
(IDi, si, Ri,⊥, Pi) and (IDi, Ri, hi) in LC and LH1 separately. Otherwise, C chooses three random numbers ri, hi, xi ∈ Z∗n ,
computes Ri = riP, Pi = xiP, si = ri + hismod n, sets H1(IDi, Ri) ← hi and stores (IDi, si, Ri, xi, Pi) and (IDi, Ri, hi) in LC
and LH1 separately.
H1(IDi, Ri): C maintains an initially empty list LH1 which contains tuples of the form (IDi, Ri, hi). If (IDi, Ri) is on the list
LH1 , C returns hi. Otherwise, C chooses a random number hi, stores (IDi, Ri, hi) in LH1 and returns hi.
H2(IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk): C maintains an initially empty list LH2 with entries of the form (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2,
Z3, sk). If the tuple is in the list LH2 , C responds with sk. Otherwise, C responds to these queries in the following way:
• If IDi = IDJ :
– C looks up the list LS for entry (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, ∗). If C finds the entry, it computes
Z2 = Z2 − ti(Tj + Pj)− xjPi. (25)
– ThenC checkswhether Z2 is correct by checkingwhether the oracleDDH(∗, ∗, ∗) outputs 1when the tuple (Pi, Tj, Z2) is
input. C also checks whether Z1 and Z3 are equal by checking whether the equations Z1 = (ti+ si)(Tj+Rj+H1(IDj, Rj))
and Z3 = tiTj hold separately. If Z1, Z2 and Z3 are correct, C stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk) in LH2 ,
where the value sk comes from LS . Otherwise, C chooses a random number sk ∈ {0, 1}k and stores the tuple
(IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk) in LH2 .
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• Otherwise:
– C looks up the list LS for entry (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, ∗). If C finds the entry, it stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk) in
LH2 , where the value sk comes from LS .
– Otherwise, C chooses a random number sk ∈ {0, 1}k and stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk) in LH2 .
RevealPartialPrivateKey(i): C looks up the list LE and returns the corresponding partial private key si to the adversaryA 2.
RevealSecretValue(i): C answers A 2’s queries as follows.
• If IDi = IDJ , then C stops the simulation.
• Otherwise, C looks up the table LC for entry (IDi, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗) and returns xi.
RevealEphemeralKey
t
i,j

: C answers A 2’s queries as follows.
• Ifti,j =SI,J , then C stops the simulation.• Otherwise, C returns the stored ephemeral private key to A 2.
RevealMasterKey: C returns the master key s to A 2.
RevealSessionKey
t
i,j

: C answers A 2’s queries as follows.
• Ifti,j =SI,J orti,j =TJ,I , then C stops the simulation.• Otherwise, C returns the session key sk to A 2.
Send
t
i,j,m

: C maintains an initially empty list LS with entries of the form (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, sk) and answersA 2’s queries
as follows.
• Ifti,j =TI,J , then C returns Ti = V to A 2.
• Otherwise, if IDi = IDJ , it generates a random ti ∈ Zn, and computes
Z2 = Z2 − ti(Tj + Pj)− xjPi. (26)
Then C checks whether Z2 is correct by checking whether the oracle DDH(∗, ∗, ∗) outputs 1 when the tuple (Pi, Tj, Z2) is
input. C also checks whether Z1 and Z3 are equal by checking whether the equations Z1 = (ti + si)(Tj + Rj + H1(IDj, Rj))
and Z3 = tiTj hold separately. If Z1, Z2 and Z3 are correct, C stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, sk) in LS , where the value sk
comes from LH2 . Otherwise, C chooses a random number sk ∈ {0, 1}k and stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, sk) in LS .• Otherwise, C replies according to the specification of the protocol.
Test
t
i,j

: C answers A 2’s queries as follows.
• Ifti,j ≠TI,J , then C stops the simulation.
• Otherwise, C generates a random number ξ ∈ {0, 1}k and returns it to A 2.
As the adversary A 2 mounts the forging attack, if A 2 succeeds, it must have queried oracle H2 on the form Z1 =
(tI + sI)(TJ + RJ + H1(IDJ , RJ)Ppub), Z2 = (tI + xI)(TJ + U) and Z3 = tITJ , where TI = V is the outgoing message of the
Test session given by the simulator and TJ is the incoming message from the adversary A 2. To solve GDH(U, V ), for all
entries in LH2 , C randomly chooses one entry with the probability
1
n2
and proceeds with the following steps:
C computes
Z2 = Z2 − xI(TJ + U). (27)
It is easy to verify that the equation Z2 = GDH(TI , TJ)+ GDH(U, V ) holds. Then C computes
GDH(U, V ) = Z2 − GDH(TI , TJ) = Z2 − Z3. (28)
The advantage of C solving the GDH problem is such that
AdvGDHC (k) ≥
1
n0n21n2
AdvA 2(k). (29)
ThenAdvGDHC (k) is non-negligible sincewe assume thatAdvA 2(k) is non-negligible. This contradicts theGDHassumption.
(1.2) The analysis of Case 3.1.2
By exchanging the roles of I and J in the above case, we can prove that AdvGDHC (k) is negligible using the same method.
To save space, we will not give the details here.
(1.3) The analysis of Case 3.1.3
C answers H1(IDi, Ri), RevealPartialPrivateKey(i), RevealEphemeralKey
t
i,j

, RevealMasterKey, RevealSessionKey
t
i,j

and Test
t
i,j

as it does in Case 3.1.3 of Lemma 3. It also answers the other queries as follows.
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Create(i): C maintains an initially empty list LC consisting of tuples of the form (IDi, si, Ri, xi, Pi). If i = I , C chooses
two random numbers hi, ri ∈ Z∗n , computes Ri = riP, Pi = U, si = ri + hismod n, sets H1(IDi, Ri) ← hi and stores
(IDi, si, Ri,⊥, Pi) and (IDi, Ri, hi) in LC and LH1 separately. Otherwise, if i = J, C chooses two random numbers hi, ri ∈ Z∗n ,
computes Ri = riP, Pi = V , si = ri + hismod n, sets H1(IDi, Ri) ← hi and stores (IDi, si, Ri,⊥, Pi) and (IDi, Ri, hi) in LC and
LH1 separately. Otherwise, C chooses three random numbers ri, hi, xi ∈ Z∗n , computes Ri = riP, Pi = xiP, si = ri + hismod n,
sets H1(IDi, Ri)← hi and stores (IDi, si, Ri, xi, Pi) and (IDi, Ri, hi) in LC and LH1 separately.
H2(IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk): C maintains an initially empty list LH2 with entries of the form (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2,
Z3, sk). If the tuple is in the list LH2 , C responds with sk. Otherwise, C responds to these queries in the following way:
• If IDi = IDI or IDi = IDJ , C simulates the oracle in the same way as in Case 3.1.1 in Lemma 3.
• Otherwise:
– C looks up the list LS for entry (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, ∗). If C finds the entry, it stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk) in
LH2 , where the value sk comes from LS .
– Otherwise, C chooses a random number sk ∈ {0, 1}k and stores the tuple (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk) in LH2 .
RevealSecretValue(i): C answers A 2’s queries as follows.
• If IDi = IDI or IDi = IDJ , then C stops the simulation.
• Otherwise, C looks up the table LC for entry (IDi, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗) and returns xi.
Send
t
i,j,m

: C maintains an initially empty list LS with entries of the form (IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, sk) and answersA 2’s queries
as follows.
• If IDi = IDI or IDi = IDJ , C simulates the oracle in the same way as in Case 3.1.1 in Lemma 3.
• Otherwise, C replies according to the specification of the protocol.
As the adversary A 2 mounts the forging attack, if A 2 succeeds, it must have queried oracle H2 on the form Z1 =
(tI+ sI)(TJ+RJ+H1(IDJ , RJ)Ppub), Z2 = (tI+xI)(TJ+U) and Z3 = tITJ , where PI = U, PJ = V and TJ is the incomingmessage
from the adversaryA 2. To solve GDH(U, V ), for all entries in LH2 , C randomly chooses one entry with the probability
1
n2
and
proceeds with the following steps:
C computes
GDH(U, V ) = Z2 − tI(TJ + U)− tJV . (30)
The advantage of C solving the GDH problem is such that
AdvGDHC (k) ≥
1
n0n21n2
AdvA 2(k).
ThenAdvGDHC (k) is non-negligible sincewe assume thatAdvA 2(k) is non-negligible. This contradicts theGDHassumption.
(1.4) The analysis of Case 3.1.4
C answers H1(IDi, Ri), RevealPartialPrivateKey(i), RevealMasterKey, RevealSessionKey
t
i,j

and Test
t
i,j

as it does in
Case 3.1.3 of Lemma 3. It also answers H2(IDi, IDj, Ti, Tj, Z1, Z2, Z3, sk), Send
t
i,j,m

, RevealEphemeralKey
t
i,j

as it does
in Case 3.1.4 of Lemma 2. It also answers the other queries as follows.
Create(i): C maintains an initially empty list LC consisting of tuples of the form (IDi, si, Ri, xi, Pi). C chooses three random
numbers ri, hi, xi ∈ Z∗n , computes Ri = riP , Pi = xiP, si = ri + hismod n, sets H1(IDi, Ri) ← hi and stores (IDi, si, Ri, xi, Pi)
and (IDi, Ri, hi) in LC and LH1 separately.
As the adversary A 2 mounts the forging attack, if A 2 succeeds, it must have queried oracle H2 on the form Z1 =
(tI + sI)(TJ + RJ + H1(IDJ , RJ)Ppub), Z2 = (tI + xI)(TJ + U) and Z3 = tITJ , where TI = U is the outgoing message of the
Test session given by the simulator and TJ = V is the incoming message from the adversary A 2. To solve GDH(U, V ), for all
entries in LH2 , C randomly chooses one entry with the probability
1
n2
and returns Z3 as the solution to GDH(U, V ).
The advantage of C solving the GDH problem is such that
AdvGDHC (k) ≥
1
n0n21n2
AdvA 2(k). (31)
Then AdvCDHC (k) is non-negligible sincewe assume that AdvA 1(k) is non-negligible. This contradicts the GDH assumption.
(2) The analysis of Case 3.2
In view of the definition of the freshness, the following two cases should be considered.
Case 3.2.1: At some point, the secret value owned by the party I has been revealed by the adversary A 2 (note that in this
case, according to the freshness definition, A 2 is not permitted to reveal the ephemeral private key of the Test session).
Being similar to Case 3.1.1 of Lemma 3, the case can be solved using the same method as in the above section. To save
space, we will not give the details here.
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Table 1
Comparisons among different protocols.
Computational cost Security
model
Assumption Message
exchange
Geng et al. protocol [12] 7Tmul + 2Th mBR GDH 2
Hou et al. protocol [13] 6Tmul + 2Th mBR GDH 2
Yang et al. protocol [14] 9Tmul + 2Th eCK GDH 2
He et al. protocol [15] 5Tmul+3Tadd+Tinv+2Th mBR GDH 3
He et al. protocol [16] 5Tmul + 4Tadd + 2Th mBR GDH 2
Our protocol 5Tmul + 3Tadd + 2Th eCK GDH 2
Case 3.2.2: The secret value owned by the party I has never been revealed by the adversary A 2 (note that in this case,
according to the freshness definition, A 2 may reveal party I ’s ephemeral private key in the Test session).
Being similar to Case 3.1.2 of Lemma 3, the case can be solved using the same method as in the above section. To save
space, we will not give the details here.
If the adversaryA 2 succeedswith non-negligible probability in any of the cases above,we can also solve theGDHproblem
with non-negligible probability, which contradicts the assumed security of the GDH problem. So we can conclude that our
protocol bases its security on the GDH problem. 
From the above three lemmas, we can get the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Our protocol is a secure CLAKA protocol in the eCK model under the GDH assumption.
5. Comparison with previous protocols
Let mBR and eCK denote the modified Bellare–Rogaway model [17] and the extended Canetti–Krawczyk model [18]
respectively. For convenience in evaluating the computational cost, we define some notation as follows:
• Tmul: The time for executing a point multiplication operation.
• Tadd: The time for executing an point addition operation.
• Tinv: The time for executing a modular inversion operation.
• Th: The time for executing a one-way hash function.
We will compare the efficiency of our protocol with five pairing-free CLAKA protocols, i.e. the Geng et al. protocol [12],
the Hou et al. protocol [13], the Yang et al. protocol [14], and the He et al. protocols [15,16]. Table 1 shows the comparison
between pairing-free CLAKA protocols in terms of efficiency, security model and underlying hardness assumptions.
Since the point multiplication operation is more complicated than the point addition operations, the modular inversion
operation and the hash function operation, our protocol has better performance than the Geng et al. protocol [12], the Hou
et al. protocol [13] and a He et al. protocol [15]. Moreover, the Geng et al. protocol [12], the Hou et al. protocol [13] and a He
et al. protocol [15] are not secure against a type 1 adversary. Then our protocol has an advantage in both performance and
security over the Geng et al. protocol [12], the Hou et al. protocol [13] and a He et al. protocol [15]. It is well known that the
eCK model is far superior to the mBRmodel. Then the Yang et al. protocol [15] and our protocol have advantages in security
over a He et al. protocol [16]. At the same time, our protocol also has better performance than a He et al. protocol [16].
Yang et al. proposed the first pairing-free CLAKA protocol, which is provably secure in the eCK model. However, in the Yang
et al. protocol, the user has to verify the validity of public keys. This not only increases the burden on the user, but also
reverses the notion of the CLPKC. From Table 1, we know that our protocol hasmuch better performance than the Yang et al.
protocol [15]. We conclude that our protocol is more suitable for practical applications.
6. Conclusion
Certificateless public key cryptography is receiving significant attention because it could solve the key escrow problem
in ID-PKC. Recently, several pairing-free CLAKA protocols have been proposed. In this paper, we proposed a new pairing-
free CLAKA protocol and proved its security in the eCK model under the GDH assumption. The proposed protocol has better
performance than the related protocols.
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